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Abstract
The thought of Charles S. Peirce can provide new keys for the study of creativity. It is 
possible to argue, based on the pragmatism that Peirce defended, that there is a form 
of reasoning that joins logical soundness and imagination. Peirce’s scientific method, 
whose power lies in a logical operation called abduction, provides important clues 
to better understand how we make new discoveries, how we embody new ideas in 
creations and, ultimately, how we think more creatively and effectively.
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Resumo
O pensamento de Charles S. Peirce pode fornecer novas chaves para o estudo da 
criatividade. É possível argumentar, com base no pragmatismo defendido por Peirce, 
que existe uma forma de raciocínio que une solidez lógica e imaginação. O método 
científico de Peirce, cujo poder está em uma operação lógica chamada abdução, 
fornece pistas importantes para entender melhor como fazemos novas descobertas, 
como incorporamos novas ideias em criações e, em última análise, como pensamos de 
forma mais criativa e eficaz.
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 Creativity is something more than the superficial vision that fashionable 
handbooks or self-help books sometimes offer. Contrary to long-standing preju-
dices and stereotypes, creativity is not at odds with depth of content, with educa-
tional discipline or with being accurate. In order to improve creativity, a sound 
theoretical basis is required, and that basis can be traced from the thought of 
Charles S. Peirce. It is possible to develop, on the basis of pragmatism, a kind of 
thought – imaginative and rigorous at the same time – which allows the poten-
tial of each person to flourish, and which has as its purpose the holistic growth 
of human beings.
 The pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce, in contrast to misinterpretations 
that stress the useful or practical character of actions, seeks to understand 
human beings in relation to their actions and that to which actions may lead, that 
is, in relation to the conceivable consequences. The creativity of this way of thin-
king lies therefore in the possibility of developing new courses of action with the 
help of imagination, in our ability to develop our conceptions in different ways, 
that is, the signs that make us able to know the world around us and to make 
that world grow. Pragmatism has to do precisely with learning from experience, 
transforming it until doubt turns into belief in a process that can be evaluated 
from a practical point of view (Chiasson, 2001, ix); pragmatism has to do with 
reason in a more effective way.
 Creativity, which is nothing other than the possibility of growing that 
soaks everything, the capacity to generate new intelligibility, is a central issue in 
Peirce's thought. Besides being a topic that he directly addresses in the metho-
dological realm, creativity is a nerve that runs through and gives life to Peirce's 
philosophical system. Everything, both the universe and human beings, is for him 
subject to constant evolution and growth, to the constant actualization of possi-
bilities. In this article, I will leave aside the metaphysical aspects of creativity 
in order to focus on certain issues arising from Peircean scientific methodology 
that can provide important clues for developing creative thinking. This can help 
to understand how humans are able to carry out their proper function: to embody 
general ideas in art-creations, in utilities and in theoretical cognition (CP 6.476, 
1908).
 The engine of creativity in Peirce is none other than abduction, a pecu-
liar operation of the mind that combines logical rigor and imagination. It is possi-
ble, using abduction, to achieve thorough and effective thinking, while being 
creative at the same time. In this article I will first explain the main features that 
something must have in order to be considered creative; I will focus after that 
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on the specific methodology of Peirce, because any improvement in creative thin-
king requires a sound understanding of how new discoveries are made. Next, I 
will explain in more detail the role and nature of abduction, and will conclude by 
focusing on certain keys for fostering creativity and removing barriers to creative 
thinking.
 I. WHAT IS CREATIVITY?
 It is important to note, first of all, that creativity is not incompatible with 
content or discipline. On the contrary, creativity has to do with exercising certain 
capacities and with promoting better reasoning, which will help us in any lear-
ning process, in expressing ourselves and in numerous situations of everyday 
life. Creative teaching, for example, is not that which takes the teaching method 
more into consideration while downplaying the content, but one in which students 
effectively internalize what they are learning and can therefore use the content 
in creative ways. Creativity is an answer, a way of expression that is only able to 
develop the person that has something to say or something to solve, and therefore 
it requires content and sufficient effort.
 For Peirce something creative means, first, an actualization of possibi-
lities within the continuity of thought. According to his synechism, Peirce argues 
that everything is continuous, both in the universe and in our thought. Synechism, 
Peirce writes, "means the tendency to regard everything as continuous,” and he 
says that he carries the doctrine "so far as to maintain that continuity governs the 
whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7565-6, 1893). All propo-
sitions are continuous with experience and with other propositions, that is, every 
element of our thought is always preceded by others with which it relates, and will 
in turn be followed by a new one. "Ideas tend to spread continually and to affect 
certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability,” writes 
Peirce (CP 6.104, 1891). We can speak of a "train of thought" which can be sket-
ched as follows:
 • Life is like a chain.
 • Our thought is continuous. There are no jumps in it. Our reasoning does 
not come out of nowhere.
 • All reasoning is preceded and followed by other instances of reasoning. 
One thing leads to another. There are no final ideas: we can never have reason 
to believe that any given idea will be established or disproved forever (CP 7.569, 
1893).
 • The continuity of thought allows us to advance step by step toward the 
truth. This is graphically expressed by Sherlock Holmes: “from a drop of water, a 
logician could infer the possibility of an Atlantic or a Niagara without having seen 
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or heard of one or the other” (Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet).
 This association of ideas that Peirce defended in the nineteenth century 
is called nowadays synectics, and it is an important item in creative thinking. 
You have to pull on an idea to see the "string" of ideas behind it, although these 
elements, at first glance, may seem to have no relationship to each other. The 
successive thoughts lead us to solutions. Peircean abduction consists precisely, 
as will be seen later, in rearranging various elements that seem unconnected, 
thus linking what at first glance may seem disparate and irrelevant.
 Creative thinking therefore implies a continuation of human ideas, a 
proceeding further in the train of thought. But that step from one thing to another 
has to have certain features to be creative: it must be new, intelligible, original, 
and valuable.
 1.  New. Novelty must exist by reference to something “old,” for without 
tradition there can’t be anything new: if something is completely new we can’t 
even express it. In that sense we can speak of an "enthusiasm for the expe-
rience" of the creative person, but we must also recognize that the creator cannot 
simply base herself on experience: creative thinking must go beyond the limits of 
past knowledge. The past may seem constrictive, but it is ultimately shown to be 
something that somehow allows creativity, inasmuch as one can continue it.
 2.  Intelligible. The novelty that something creative possesses is inextri-
cably linked to a new requirement: the work must be intelligible within that dialo-
gue between old and new. It's not about what's new for the sake of newness; it 
must have a character, a quality that makes it possible to be recognized, identi-
fiable. "The new thing must have a character, an identifiable principle or quality, 
and this character is identifiable because it seems to be something we may in the 
future be able to connect with other things" (Hausman, 1987, 381). Thus, a pain-
ting has something that makes it identifiable and related to a particular style, or 
to other styles of the past, or it may potentially be framed by future trends, or a 
literary work can be ascribed to a genre, etc.
 3.  Original. Besides novelty and intelligibility, a third feature of the 
creative, often mentioned, is originality. Some scholars have defined this 
as the ability to make connections to something that was not previously 
connected in this way (Boden, 1999, 369), and sometimes it is not clear 
where the difference lies between novelty and originality. In my unders-
tanding, speaking of originality is to put the emphasis not on the diffe-
rence, but rather on being yourself, on the personal factor that is added to 
what is created. Originality appears, in this sense, as the ability to express 
oneself, to express one’s own personal being. Everything in which one can 
recognize oneself would be creative: the originality of a work of art has to 
do with the ability for expression. What makes something original is not 
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exactly what makes it new – a difference of intelligibility – but what remains 
of the creator in the work of art.
 4.  Valuable. Creative objects or ideas, moreover, are valuable or appro-
priate. The creative work must have an external value; it is not a subjective 
phenomenon, and that makes something creative differ from a purely extrava-
gant invention. An external result is necessary: being creative is not the same as 
being brilliant or witty. The artist or the scientist create something new that has 
real value. It is difficult to define what is valuable, but as Hausman noted, we can 
speak of certain conditions that demand our attention and prompt us to judge 
that the new thing should exist (Hausman, 1987, 382). I would like to clarify that 
we are not referring here only to an instrumental value. Of course what is created 
is good for something, for example in the history of literature or art, but the crea-
tive work must in addition have a value in itself, must be intrinsically good, in the 
sense that it should exist because it is what it is. For example, we say that a novel 
is good simply because we are delighted in reading it, we appreciate a value in it, 
whatever place it may take in the history of literature.
 In the case of science, the value of the creative hypothesis lies in its being 
a successful explanation of the world. Thus, an original and novel hypothesis that 
is not a successful explanation can’t be considered creative: scientific hypothe-
ses must explain the facts. In the case of art, the value of the creative idea does 
not consist in its power to explain reality, but in its ability to express feelings that 
take shape and meet an initial restlessness. An artist does not seek to unders-
tand what is true nor is he aimed at discovery, but seeks to express something in 
a beautiful way.
 We now have in our hands the first keys to understanding something 
creative. Experience and tradition must be taken as a starting point, and to the 
analysis of the different elements a personal development must be added, some-
thing that is a continuation of prior human thought and which results in something 
new, intelligible, original, and valuable. Next, I will discuss the specific methodo-
logy for doing so.
 II. CHARLES S. PEIRC’S METHODOLOGY 
 
 The need to choose a particular methodology in order to develop our 
reasoning, creations and research implies, for Peirce, that thinking is not some-
thing that just happens, but is something that we can control and improve. If a 
person tries to direct her own thinking and focus her first instincts, she will have a 
better capacity for pursuing her goals. We should all be logicians, not in the sense 
of being experts in formal logic, but, as Peirce said, in the sense of learning to think 
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rigorously, to find those classes of reasoning that, if persisted in, must eventually 
lead to truth about the problems they are applicable to – if not to the absolute 
truth then at least to an indefinite approximation (CP 2.200, c.1902). We must, 
says Peirce, apply to our own acquired habits of researching – or of creation – 
the art of logical analysis, an art as elaborate and methodical as that of a chemi-
cal analyst. We must learn to think, that is, we need to train our reason to make 
it more effective, because bad arguments are the basis of many misunderstan-
dings and problems.
 Therefore, to become better thinkers, and also more creative persons, 
we have to choose the way we will reason and respect it, without ever despising 
other modes of thought:
The genius of a man's logical method should be loved and 
reverenced as his bride, whom he has chosen from amongst 
all the world. He need not condemn the others; on the con-
trary, he may honor them deeply, and in doing so he only 
honors his chosen one the more. But she is the one that he 
has chosen, and he knows that he was right in making that 
choice. And having made it, he will work and fight for her, and 
will not complain that there are blows to take, hoping that 
there may be as many and as hard to give, and will strive to 
be the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of 
whose splendors he draws his inspiration and his courage 
(CP 5.387, 1877).
 The choice of a method is therefore one of the most important decisions 
we can make, for it will direct our life, and though Peirce does not reject any other 
particular method – because he thinks the research-road must never be closed 
– for him the superiority of the scientific method is clear. Peirce states in his arti-
cle The Fixation of Belief (CP 5.358-5.387, 1877) that there are four different 
methods that can lead to overcoming doubt and to the establishment of a belief: 
tenacity, authority, a priori method and science. Tenacity would be the method of 
those people who cling to their own beliefs and hold them without wavering; the 
method of authority would accept what others – an institution or group of people 
– impose on us, making us intellectual slaves; the a priori method is to believe 
what one tends to believe, that which seems true according to our own reason. 
For Peirce the a priori method is valuable, but contains an accidental element 
that is not based on experience or universal nature but on personal preferences, 
and therefore research becomes something like the development of taste. The 
method of science, meanwhile, is the only one that is based on experience and 
presupposes the existence of reality, that is, of real things that affect our senses 
according to regular laws, independently of our opinions. The scientific method 
Porto Arte, Porto Alegre, v. 25, n. 41 p. 1 -23, jul / dez 2019. 7
ENSAIO E ARTIGO
assumes that we can know how things are, and that anyone with enough expe-
rience and reason will come to the same conclusion. It is the only method that, 
since it is based on experience, makes agreement among all people possible.
 Although Peirce developed his methodology in the field of science, 
it should not be limited only to that domain. The methodology of Peirce – what 
he called the “scientific method” – is much more than a way to make scientific 
discoveries: it actually aspires to be the right way to proceed with any research 
program concerning reality, that is, with any creative approach to our world. It is 
a tool we can all use: "Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many 
things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it,” says 
Peirce (CP 5.384, 1877). Scientific methodology must be used, according to Peirce, 
in any investigation that seeks to be serious and rigorous, whatever its object. This 
methodology can be used even in the most creative areas of human culture, for 
example, in art. What is, then, this Peircean method?
 a) Starting point
The method, as it is characterized by Peirce, begins with known and observed 
facts, after which it proceeds into the unknown. All research originates with the 
observation of a surprising phenomenon, in an experience that makes us aban-
don some expectation or a habit break. In The Fixation of Belief, Peirce writes that 
research always starts from doubt, not a methodological doubt in the Cartesian 
sense, but a real question – "a real and living doubt" – that arises in us through 
experience.
 Therefore, the implementation of the thought process requires determi-
ning what it is that surprises us or what it is we notice as strange, that is, identi-
fying that which – in our experience – is not perceived as it should be and causes 
us restlessness, a state of doubt which we desire to overcome. The problem 
to solve must be clear to us, and sometimes this will require us to redefine the 
problem in order to understand it better: a correct question is part of the solution. 
To redefine problems, sometimes it may be useful to express them in a written 
form, to perform an analysis of their limits, to try to express a situation metaphori-
cally, or to ask simple questions such as when, where, etc.
From this starting point, the three stages of the scientific method, strictly 
speaking, develop.
 b) Initial or abductive stage: (we seek a hypothesis)
 This phase involves the search for and development of an initial hypo-
thesis. From the observations and surprising facts, a conjecture that provides a 
possible explanation arises. This means, as Peirce states, that a syllogism arises 
that shows the surprising fact as necessarily resulting from the circumstances of 
its occurrence along with the truth of the credible conjecture as premises.
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 In this stage we don’t have a particular theory in mind, though surpri-
sing facts make us feel that a theory is needed to explain them.
 c) Intermediate or deductive stage: (we seek consequences)
 The initial hypothesis must be tested. This test, says Peirce, “to be 
logically valid must honestly start, not as abduction starts, with scrutiny of the 
phenomena, but with examination of the hypothesis, and a muster of all sorts 
of conditional experiential consequences which would follow from its truth” (CP 
6.470, 1908). The second stage of the research therefore consists in collecting 
the possible consequences of the hypothesis. This stage is carried out by logi-
cal analysis.
 d) Final or inductive stage (we seek facts)
The purpose of Deduction, that of collecting consequents 
of the hypothesis, having been sufficiently carried out, the 
inquiry enters upon its third stage, that of ascertaining how 
far those consequents accord with Experience, and of jud-
ging accordingly whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct, 
or requires some inessential modification, or else must be 
entirely rejected (CP 6.472, 1908).
 This final stage starts from a hypothesis that seems to recommend 
itself because of its possible consequences. We feel that facts are needed 
to support the hypothesis, and the study of it will suggest the experiments 
needed.
 We can only grant a significant value to the creative hypothesis after 
induction. “Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that 
something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something 
may be” (CP 5.171, 1903). In order to think more effectively, we must learn 
to reason abductively, deductively and inductively, that is, we must learn to 
come up with conjectures or possible explanations, to develop the consequen-
ces that would follow from adopting one point of view or another, and to verify 
those consequences in practice. We must learn to generate new possibilities 
and to reason while taking into consideration the consequences that would 
necessarily follow from our actions.
Porto Arte, Porto Alegre, v. 25, n. 41 p. 1 -23, jul / dez 2019. 9
ENSAIO E ARTIGO
 III.  ABDUCTION: MOTOR OF CREATIVITY
 For Peirce, abduction is the most important stage of his method, since it 
would be impossible to obtain new knowledge without it. Abduction is "the only 
logical operation which introduces any new idea" (CP 5.171, 1903).
 Peirce holds the premise that we cannot discover the truth by chance; 
it would be impossible, says Peirce, to guess the right hypothesis among the infi-
nity of possible hypotheses only by chance. There must be some capacity that 
makes us be right quite often. How did a chemist, for example, ever come up with 
a correct theory about nature, asks Peirce in 1903. He answers:
You cannot say that it happened by chance, because the pos-
sible theories, if not strictly innumerable, at any rate exceed 
a trillion – or the third power of a million; and therefore, the 
chances are too overwhelmingly against the single true theory 
in the twenty or thirty thousand years during which man has 
been a thinking animal, ever having come into any man's head. 
(CP 5.591, 1903)
 The human mind has a natural adaptation for imagining correct theories 
(CP 5.591, 1903) that is expressed through abduction. We owe to it every discovery 
and every creation. "Not the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond 
the stage of vacant staring without making an abduction at every step" (MS 692, 
1901), writes Peirce. He attributed to abduction the emergence of the first idea, 
in which the full force of the creative advance is already contained. Abduction is 
directly responsible for discovery, and it constitutes the beginning of a process 
that culminates with a scientific achievement.
 The explanation of this process of discovery may not, for Peirce, be purely 
psychological: “let me tell you that all the psychology in the world will leave the 
logical problem just where it was” (CP 5.172, 1903). This process is structured 
and susceptible to logical explanation: "there is a purely logical doctrine of how 
discovery must take place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is 
my plain task and duty here to explore" (CP 2.107, c.1902). Hull has affirmed that 
achieving a harmony between creativity and logic was one of Peirce’s underlying 
philosophical tasks, and in order to do so he had to reformulate logic itself in a 
radical way (Hull, 1994, 271). Abduction is one of the key issues for this reformu-
lation. The special nature of abduction turns the logical process leading to disco-
very – without ceasing to be logical – into a mixture of several factors, not just 
rationality, that explain the surprising and unexpected nature of the new finding. 
Among these factors are imagination and instinct, without which we could not 
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come up with possible solutions nor hit on the hypothesis that has the best fit. 
So, creativity and logic are not mutually excluding: creative thinking can combine 
imagination and logical rigor thanks to abduction.
 The methodological and logical aspect of the creative process implies 
that, in a way, it can be learned and developed, although it is not an exact 
process. The creative capacity of human beings can be developed through iden-
tifying the steps of the most appropriate method, as I have already explained, 
and improving the capacity of abduction. I will now try to explain in a bit more 
detail what that abductive capacity consists in.
 Abduction, according to Peirce, "consists in examining a mass of facts 
and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory" (CP 8.209, 1905). An example of 
abduction would be the doctor who considers a patient's symptoms “surprising.” 
The doctor takes note of these symptoms and tries to find a diagnosis in which 
his vision is expanded, and the symptoms he reported appear to be the result of 
an inferred disease. This is only possible if he finds in his knowledge something 
that can explain the results that are presented and that are displayed in light of 
the hypothesis as a case of something. Abduction provides an explanation from 
a broader point of view on what happens ("your symptoms are a case of..."), and 
it needs more than medical knowledge: it also needs the ability of the doctor to 
relate medical signs and symptoms that originally appeared unconnected. 
 Further examples of abduction are the detectives who, like Sherlock 
Holmes or Auguste Dupin, solve an enigma from a few clues. Although detec-
tive powers have traditionally been attributed to deduction, we argue, following 
Peirce, that they are actually clear instances of abduction, that is, of reasoning 
by conjecture.
 In addition to medical and detective procedures, there are other exam-
ples of abduction that Peirce himself provided:
I once landed at a seaport in a Turkish province; and, as I 
was walking up to the house which I was to visit, I met a man 
upon horseback, surrounded by four horsemen holding a 
canopy over his head. As the governor of the province was 
the only personage I could think of who would be so greatly 
honored, I inferred that this was he. This was an hypothesis. 
Fossils are found; say, remains like those of fishes, but far in 
the interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon, we 
suppose the sea once washed over this land. This is another 
hypothesis. (CP 2.625, 1893)
 Abduction therefore means formulating an explanatory guess that 
involves novelty. Certain features of this mode of reasoning, some of them 
already mentioned, will be summarized in what follows:
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 1. Abduction would not be possible without prior knowledge. Such 
knowledge makes the conclusion possible, even though the conclusion is not 
determined by it. Peirce claims that abduction has an original character (CP 5.181, 
1903), since the novel conclusion is not contained in the premises. Abduction 
discovers unique or unusual relationships between things and existing ideas:
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act 
of insight, although extremely fallible insight. It is true that the 
different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; 
but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before 
dreamed of putting together which flashes the new sugges-
tion before our contemplation. (CP 5.181, 1903)
 2. Abduction has a logical form, which Peirce describes as follows: "The 
surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true" (CP 5.189, 1903).
 3. Abduction starts in surprise: "It is by surprises that experience 
teaches all she deigns to teach us" (CP 5.51, 1903). Something that is already 
present and surprising leads to a possible explanation that opens doors to the 
future, to further knowledge. Learning is a process of allowing facts to surprise 
us and of originating ideas to explain what surprises us. In abduction we believe 
that the strange and unusual fact that we have observed may be the result of a 
general law, that is, although the fact observed is singular, it puts us on the track 
of something general. If our conjecture is true, our knowledge will be expanded.
 4. The abductive capacity means being able to reason backwards. 
From a result, we are able to develop the steps that have led us to that result. 
Although sometimes an hypothesis seems to arise in an almost magical way, we 
can provide a posteriori an explanation of how we got there, which paths we have 
followed, although perhaps in a not entirely conscious way.
 Correct hypotheses are therefore the result of a process, although a process 
not conscious enough to be controlled or, to put it more aptly, a non-controllable and 
therefore not entirely conscious process. But that seemingly magical ability is ratio-
nal, logical and creative at the same time; it combines logical rigor with imagination 
to invent possible explanations. The abductive capacity plays an essential role in 
science, but also in other subjects, even in all the decisions we make in life. Abduction 
is equally important in art, which seeks something that has the nature of a discovery, 
and which, like all discoveries, occurs for Peirce through abduction, which frees us to 
explain the unexplainable, without any other limit than that of imagination. 
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 IV.  HOW TO ENCOURAGE CREATIVITY 
 As we have said, to encourage creative thinking one has to improve 
abductive capacity; that is, to be able to reason from the given facts devising 
possible solutions and alternatives, broader ways of thinking, new perspecti-
ves that include what has been experienced and give it a meaning. We must 
then pay attention to the following points:
 1. Be aware that we can improve our processes of reasoning.
 To learn how to think more creatively and effectively the first thing to 
do is to want to do it, that is, to realize that we do not yet know how to think. It 
is a fact that we think, but we can learn to think better. Peirce argued that there 
is a logica docens and a logica utens (CP 2.186-190, c.1902).
 • Logica utens is a “homespun” logic, a rudimentary sense of logic 
that we all use, a general method by which everyone obtains truths, even 
without being aware of doing so and without being able to specify what their 
method was. Peirce wrote: “You think that your logica utens is more or less 
unsatisfactory. But you do not doubt that there is some truth in it” (CP 2.192, 
c.1902). 
 • Logica docens is a more sophisticated logic practiced by logicians 
and scientists, doctors, detectives, and experts that can be taught and learned 
consciously. It is a method developed to uncover the truth and think better.
 Our task then is to move from logica utens to logica docens, to 
develop our natural logic and become aware of our thought processes in order 
to improve them.
 2. Learn to find possible explanations for things.
 We usually think of Sherlock Holmes as a bloodhound. This is the 
description that Watson gives of Holmes’ transformation when he was follo-
wing a clue:
Men who had only known the quiet thinker and logician of 
Baker Street would have failed to recognize him. [...] His nos-
trils seemed to dilate with a purely animal lust for the chase, 
and his mind was so absolutely concentrated upon the mat-
ter before him that a question or remark fell unheeded upon 
his ears, or, at the most, only provoked a quick, impatient 
snarl in reply." (CONAN DOYLE, The Boscombe Valley Mystery)
Porto Arte, Porto Alegre, v. 25, n. 41 p. 1 -23, jul / dez 2019. 13
ENSAIO E ARTIGO
 Without reaching the level of Sherlock Holmes, we can all develop our 
abductive and detective skills, and apply them not only in our research but also 
in our daily lives. We can teach our mind to find the conscious and unconscious 
clues that lead us to devise possible solutions for the problems that we face. It is 
important that we use our abilities to think of possible explanations, not only for 
great mysteries but also for mysteries of ordinary life.
 3. Learn to broaden our perspective.
 To make good guesses we need some distance, that is, to look beyond 
what is before our eyes. Sometimes, we also need to change our mental cons-
tructs and find more than a single type of response. Sometimes, it may be useful 
to not dedicate all one's attention to the matter at hand, but to let it get out of 
focus. It is necessary, wrote Edgar Allan Poe in a text that we know that Peirce 
read (CP 6.460, 1908), not to look straight ahead:
Vidocq, for example, was a good guesser, and a persevering 
man. But, without educated thought, he erred continually 
wandered by an excessive ardor of his research. He damaged 
his vision by the very intensity of his investigations. He impai-
red his vision by holding the object too close. He might see, 
perhaps, one or two points with unusual clearness, but in so 
doing he necessarily lost sight of the matter as a whole. Thus, 
there is such a thing as being too profound. Truth is not always 
in a well. In fact, as regards the more important knowledge, I 
do believe that she is invariably superficial. The depth lies in 
the valleys where we seek her, and not upon the mountain-
-tops where she is found. The modes and sources of this kind 
of error are well typified in the contemplation of the heavenly 
bodies. To look at a star by glances, to view it in a side-long 
way, by turning toward it the exterior portions of the retina 
(more susceptible of feeble impressions of light than the inte-
rior) is to behold the star distinctly, is to have the best appre-
ciation of its lustre, a lustre which grows dim just in proportion 
as we turn our vision fully upon it. (ALLAN POE, The Murders 
in the Rue Morgue)
There is a very useful tool to defocus our attention, introduce new perspecti-
ves and develop the imagination, which both Peirce and John Dewey recommended. 
Peirce called that tool musement; it could also be called daydreaming or mental 
game. Letting the mind wander is usually a good technique for introducing new 
perspectives on an issue. Encouraging this "play" with ideas, developing concepts 
in their logical implications of interdependence and relationships – without any 
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reference to their application or their real existence – that is, the development 
of a conceptual map, has great benefits. This is to promote a constructive play, 
at times unconscious, with meanings and relationships (Dewey, 1933, 262). In 
musement the mind goes free, loose, from one thing to another, without following 
any rules. Peirce characterizes it as a purposeless play of mind: "it involves no 
purpose save that of casting aside all serious purpose." It has no rules, "except 
this very law of liberty" (CP 6.458, 1908). Musement is not limited to scientific 
study or logical analysis: “I should lament to find anybody confining it to a method 
of such moderate fertility as logical analysis” (CP 6.461, 1908). It is precisely the 
non-reduction to science or logic which gives it much wider possibilities (CP 6.461, 
1908). 
 Musement is a mental state of free speculation, without limitation of any 
kind, In which the mind plays with ideas and can dialogue with what is perceived, 
in a dialogue made up not only of words but also of images, a dialogue in which 
imagination plays an essential role:
Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought, 
and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your 
eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, and open 
conversation with yourself; for such is all meditation. It is, 
however, not a conversation in words alone, but is illustrated, 
like a lecture, with diagrams and with experiment. (CP 6.461, 
1908)
 Singer has written that much of the imaginative activity takes the form of 
daydreaming, which can be considered very similar to the Peircean musement:
Much of imaginative thought takes the form of daydreaming, 
which usually involves shifts of attention away from an imme-
diate task or concrete mental problem to seemingly task-un-
related images or thought sequences. Such daydreams may 
range from memories to wishful future events, or to playful 
story-like reshapings of current concerns of the individual or of 
long-standing desires. (SINGER, 1999, 14)
 Musement, this peculiar daydreaming, a wandering of the mind, is a 
unique imaginative experience that will enable abduction to arise. In order to be 
more creative, we should give to our minds the time and the possibility of "wande-
ring" and exploring new possibilities.
Porto Arte, Porto Alegre, v. 25, n. 41 p. 1 -23, jul / dez 2019. 15
ENSAIO E ARTIGO
 4. Develop our powers of observation
 In order to improve our logical and creative thinking, we must learn to 
be observant people. Peirce took time to train his faculties of perception and atta-
ched great importance to the ability of being impressed, since the feelings that 
things cause in us will be combined later with an imaginative and rational deve-
lopment. In Peirce’s scientific methodology that "impressionist" aspect of obser-
vation is highly meaningful, since abduction is grounded on a variety of impres-
sions derived from experience that somehow are shaped and become a rational 
hypothesis. Observation, often unconscious, is also the most important in practi-
cal reasoning (RLT, 182).
 The powers of observation is critical for reasoning, and can be improved. 
Just as an untrained person can get in shape with regular exercise, says Peirce, a 
person whose powers of observation have been lost through lack of use can also 
obtain amazing results by analogous exercises (RLT, 183). Peirce writes:
I've been through a systematic process of training to recognize 
my feelings. I worked intensively for many hours a day every 
day for many years to train myself in this; and is a workout I 
recommend you all. The artist has such training. (CP 5.112, 
1903)
 The observation of data and the development of our perceptual abili-
ties become therefore critically important for following a correct methodology. You 
must be aware not only of the most obvious, of the things everyone sees, but also 
of smaller things, those little details that are often overlooked:
"By an examination of the ground I gained the trifling details 
which I gave to that imbecile Lestrade [Scotland Yard inspec-
tor], as to the personality of the criminal."
"But how did you gain them?"
"You know my method. It is founded upon the observation of 
trifles." 
(CONAN DOYLE, The Boscombe Valley Mystery)
 The cause of the failures of the police in many Sherlock Holmes stories 
is that they tend to adopt the hypothesis that would more probably explain a few 
striking facts, ignoring the trifles and rejecting the data that would not support 
their initial hypothesis, but where however may lie the solution: "There is nothing 
more deceptive than an obvious fact."
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 For a good observation is essential to see that which is before us, to 
see it such as it is, as present, without being replaced by any interpretation, and 
without allowing any circumstance that could change it. Sometimes we do not 
see what is before our eyes, but what should be, since our gaze is conditioned by 
prejudices, by preconceived ideas, or by that which we hope to see.
When the ground is covered by snow on which the sun shi-
nes brightly except where shadows fall, if you ask any ordinary 
man what its color appears to be, he will tell you white, pure 
white, whiter in the sunlight, a little greyish in the shadow. But 
that is not what is before his eyes that he is describing; it is his 
theory of what ought to be seen. The artist will tell him that the 
shadows are not grey but a dull blue and that the snow in the 
sunshine is of a rich yellow. (CP 5.42, 1903)
 We must look at the world with a gaze free of prejudices, and we must 
let experience talk to us, realizing that we must not only see the data but also the 
absence of data. We must perceive the experience such as it is, and then be aware 
of the gaps in it so as to fill them in.
 5. Imagine what may be the truth
 “It is not too much to say,” wrote Peirce, “that next after the passion 
to learn there is no quality so indispensable to the successful prosecution of 
science as imagination” (CP 1.47, c.1896). Imagination has been defined as the 
"ability of the individual to reproduce images or concepts derived originally from 
the basic senses, but now reflected in one's consciousness as memories, fanta-
sies or future plans" (Singer, 1999, 13). Imagination is able to form images not 
subject to the here and now of perception, and is able also to freely combine 
representative contents to build new forms.
 Against the repression of rationalist positions, it can be said that imagi-
nation allows us to sort the complexity of experience and of the world in which 
we live; it allows us to face our communicative relationships with others and to 
develop the openness belonging to human personality. Everything happens in 
our imagination, and everything goes through it; its role is essential to unders-
tanding human rationality. The big question then is how to feed our imagination?
 Part of the difficulty of feeding the imagination is, as Cuffaro said, the 
intangible character of that which we have to feed (Cuffaro, 1995, 96). However, 
imagination can and should be trained. Imagination can be improved through 
practice, by engaging in real and, above all, mental experiments, creating inter-
nal situations in which we ask ourselves "what would I do if ...,” devising hypo-
theses, interpretations, and learning to see the meaning behind things and facts.
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 Besides musement, already mentioned in the third point of this section, 
reading and writing are also great tools that allow us to explore new possibilities. 
We have to get used to imaginatively exploring what it means in terms of possibi-
lities to perform this or that action, to analyzing possible implications and applica-
tions of facts. Teaching someone to reason is not just teaching her to reach conclu-
sions, but also teaching to create opportunities.
 An impoverished imagination makes us unable to cope with our 
problems because we cannot overcome a flat perspective; it impairs human rela-
tionships because we cannot put ourselves in the shoes of the other person; and 
it also prevents us from appreciating the various dimensions of experience, from 
enjoying artistic expression, etc. Imagination gives us the freedom to escape from 
an isolated and impoverished life, to grow, and to transform and enrich our own 
experience.
 We need good abductors, and for that it is necessary to make imagination 
grow through the exploration of possibilities, together with free play with ideas. 
Einstein said that imagination is more important than knowledge. Contrary to 
what we might think, it is through this apparent imaginative rambling, whose trail 
sometimes leads us far from our topic, that the logical mind reaches its maximum 
efficiency.
 6. Select the simplest and most natural explanation.
 In 1908, Peirce wrote: “Modern science has been built after the model of 
Galileo, who founded it, on il lume naturale. That truly inspired prophet had said 
that, of two hypotheses, the simpler is to be preferred,” but not simple in the sense 
of “logically simple" but “the simpler hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and 
natural, the one that instinct suggests,” the one that adds less to the observed (CP 
6.477, 1908). 
 The solution appears to us as the most reasonable and simple one, in the 
circumstances. Peirce wrote:
 
Science will cease to progress if ever we shall reach the point 
where there is no longer an infinite saving of expense in experi-
mentation to be effected by care that our hypotheses are such 
as naturally recommend themselves to the mind, and make 
upon us the impression of simplicity, which here means facility 
of comprehension by the human mind, of aptness, of reasona-
bleness, of good sense. (CP 7.220, 1901)
 How do we know which hypothesis is simpler and better? It is clear, 
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 1. It must be capable of being subjected to experimental testing. “It 
must consist of experiential consequences with only so much logical cement 
as is needed to render them rational” (CP 7.220, 1901). “Experimental testing” 
doesn't just mean laboratory testing; rather, it encompasses all those proce-
dures – in a broader sense–by which a hypothesis can be compared to 
experience.
 2. The hypothesis must be such that it will explain the surprising 
facts we have before us and which we are trying to rationalize. “This explana-
tion,” Peirce wrote, “may consist in making the observed facts natural chance 
results, as the kinetical theory of gases explains facts; or it may render the 
facts necessary, and in the latter case as implicitly asserting them or as the 
ground for a mathematical demonstration of their truth” (CP 7.220). 
 3. “In the third place, quite as necessary a consideration as either of 
those I have mentioned, in view of the fact that the true hypothesis is only one 
out of innumerable possible false ones, in view, too, of the enormous expen-
siveness of experimentation in money, time, energy, and thought, is the consi-
deration of economy.” Peirce goes on: “if a hypothesis can be put to the test of 
experiment with very little expense of any kind, that should be regarded as a 
recommendation for giving it precedence in the inductive procedure. For even 
if it be barely admissible for other reasons, still it may clear the ground to have 
disposed of it (CP 7.220).” In this sense, a hypothesis that is easily disposable 
can also be very helpful.
 If we follow the above steps, asserted Peirce, we can easily arrive at 
the correct hypothesis: 
The history of science proves that when the phenomena were 
properly analyzed, upon fundamental points, at least, it has 
seldom been necessary to try more than two or three hypo-
theses made by clear genius before the right one was found. 
(…) We cannot go so far as to say that high human intelligence 
is more often right than wrong in its guesses; but we can say 
that, after due analysis, and unswerved by prepossessions, 
it has been, and no doubt will be, not very many times more 
likely to be wrong than right. (CP 7.220)
 
 The proper analysis of a hypothesis involves not being swayed only 
by what seems "plausible" to us, but always considering also the three factors 
quoted.
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 7. Think about the possible consequences
 Although new ideas sometimes dazzle us, we must not forget that the 
first hypotheses, however correct we feel they are, are just that: hypotheses. 
We should never neglect the deductive and inductive stages of the methodo-
logy, either in science or in art or in everyday life. Only after those stages can 
our ideas possess value as truth.
 The proper method of research involves learning to think about the 
consequences of actions and facts, analyzing and separating their compo-
nents, and then trying to check them one by one, to gather enough convincing 
support.
 Peirce’s pragmatism maintained that the idea of something is the 
idea of its effects, a conviction that ought to be very present in the method we 
follow. The meaning of an intellectual concept is determined by the practical 
consequences of that concept. Recognizing a concept under its various disgui-
ses, or a mere logical analysis, is not sufficient to understand that concept: it is 
necessary to reach a third degree of clarity that can only be obtained through 
the practical effects of the concept. This pragmatist conviction is precisely what 
reveals for us the possibility of and the need to be creative, for imagination 
and creativity are indispensable for ascertaining the possible consequences 
of something, the facts to which it may lead, and to devise possible paths for 
further action.
 Although pragmatism started as a logical method for clarifying 
concepts, it became a whole way of thinking about investigation, knowledge 
and human progress toward truth. In this Peircean conception, we find that 
neither the universe nor human life are already done or finished; rather, they 
are something open that has to be developed in the future, thereby supporting 
a creative vision.
 8. Remember that creativity needs hard work 
 Creativity is often associated with spontaneity, but as Peirce stated, 
it is not realized without prior knowledge and experience: “The scientific man 
hangs upon the lips of nature, in order to learn wherein he is ignorant and 
mistaken: the whole character of the scientific procedure springs from that 
disposition” (CP 8.118, s.f.). Each thought is a sign for a posterior one; each 
reasoning involves another reasoning, and creative abduction needs expe-
rience to begin: “The order of the march of suggestion in abduction is from 
experience to hypothesis (CP 2.755, c.1905).”
 Contrary to what is sometimes thought, good ideas do not come out of 
nowhere. Good ideas do not come without a lot of previous work.
 In order to be creative, we must avoid improvisation and superficiality. 
One thing is efficiency and speed of thought, and another improvisation. Some-
times we talk about serendipity, that is, to discover things by chance. However, 
this can only happen when the mind is sufficiently prepared.
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 CONCLUSION
 "Do not block the way of inquiry,” Peirce wrote. “To barricade the 
road of further advance toward the truth,” he said, “is the only unpardonable 
offense in reasoning” (CP 1135-6, c.1899).
 What are the main barriers that can hinder creative thinking and 
therefore investigation?
 • Absolute assertion: to think that we own the truth, that things have 
reached their perfect formulation.
That we can be sure of nothing in science is an ancient 
truth. The Academy taught it. Yet science has been infes-
ted with overconfident assertion, especially on the part of 
the third-rate and fourth-rate men, who have been more 
concerned with teaching than with learning, at all times (CP 
1.137, c.1899).
• Maintaining that some things never can be known or can never be 
carried out.
It is easy enough to mention a question the answer to 
which is not known to me today. But to aver that that 
answer will not be known tomorrow is somewhat risky; for 
oftentimes it is precisely the least expected truth which is 
turned up under the ploughshare of research (CP 1.138, 
c.1899).
 • Laziness.
 • Narrow vision: to resist changes of mind.
 • Searching for a single answer.
 • Not seeing the obvious (that which is transparent to us).
 • Fear of ridicule.
 • Fear of failure.
 • Inability to self-criticize
 • Judging something instead of just looking.
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 It must be said that we cannot be absolutely sure of anything, and that 
there is nothing unknowable or inexplicable. Although we can’t reach absolute 
truth, we can take important steps on the road to knowing how things are and to 
invent new possibilities, as long as we want to do so:
Inquiry of every type, fully carried out, has the vital power of self-
-correction and of growth. This is a property so deeply saturating 
its inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is but one 
thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active 
desire to learn what is true. If you really want to learn the truth, 
you will, by however devious a path, be surely led into the way of 
truth, at last. No matter how erroneous your ideas of the method 
may be at first, you will be forced at length to correct them so long 
as your activity is moved by that sincere desire. (CP 5.582, 1898)
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